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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents the question of whether a person who is mentally ill and possibly
homeless, but not posing a danger of physical harm to himself or others, or committing any
crime, may be lawfully seized and taken into custody by a police officer. Gregory Towner was
convicted of possessing methamphetamine based on evidence discovered after an officer took
him into "protective custody" for the purpose of taking him to a hospital for mental health
treatment and care.

After the officer had handcuffed Mr. Towner and announced he was

transporting him to the hospital, the officer searched inside of Mr. Towner's pockets, including
his small coin pocket, purportedly for weapons. Upon feeling what he thought was a small
plastic replacement razor head with the plastic covering still on it, the officer removed it and
discovered the item to be methamphetamine. At the time of his seizure and search, Mr. Towner
was not suspected of committing any crime.
Mr. Towner moved to suppress the evidence arguing the officer's conduct violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. The district court concluded that the officer was acting within his
community caretaking function and denied the motion to suppress. However, the district court
ignored the statutory requirements that must be met before an officer is permitted to take a
person into mental health protective custody; specifically, that an officer must have a reason to
believe the person either is gravely disabled due to mental illness, or poses an imminent danger
to himself or others. See Idaho Code § 66-326.
On appeal, Mr. Towner argues the officer's conduct in taking him into custody violated
the statute and that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the actions fell
within the community caretaking exception. He alternatively argues that the district court erred

1

in ruling that the search of his pockets was justified as an exercise of the officer's community
caretaking function.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On an August evening at about 6:00 o'clock, Officer Johns was on patrol and responded
to a request from dispatch for a welfare check of a male, reportedly standing on the roadside and
apparently hallucinating. (Tr., p.13, Ls.1-24.) Officer Johns pulled into the parking lot adjacent
to the location, and he saw Mr. Towner standing alone on the comer of the crosswalk, and he
appeared to be having an argument with the sky, making "aggressive actions towards the air."
(Tr., p.14, Ls.1-4.)
The officer testified he recognized Mr. Towner from previous interactions and that he
knew Mr. Towner "does have mental health issues." 1 (Tr., p.17, Ls.9-15.) The officer was also
aware of a call a few days earlier from a "group home" 2 where Mr. Towner had been living,
stating that Mr. Towner was now "out on his own" and "possibly using illegal substances," and
that a welfare check might be warranted. (Tr., p.17, Ls.2-8.)
The officer tried to contact Mr. Towner, but according to the officer, "as soon as he saw
me he started walking towards the street until I called out to him, so he never actually got into
the road." (Tr., p.26, Ls.12-16.) The officer called out to Mr. Towner, and Mr. Towner walked
hurriedly over to where the officer was standing. (See. (DefEx.A, at 0:05-1:00.) The exchange
was recorded on Officer Johns' bodycam video, which was played for the court during the
suppression hearing. (See DefEx.A.)
1

The officer provided no description of his previous interactions with Mr. Towner, nor did he
indicate Mr. Towner had a criminal history or history of drug use. (See generally Tr., p.8, L.3 p.33, L.24.)
2
There is no evidence as to the nature of the "group home" or that Mr. Towner was obligated to
reside at the group home. (See generally Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.33, L.24.)
2

At the beginning of their conversation, Mr. Towner told the officer he had been off his
medications for a little while, and he initially agreed with the officer that it would be a good idea
for him to go to the hospital to get back on his medications. (DefEx.A, at 0:40 - 1:00.) The
officer told Mr. Towner that he "can't just take you for no reason," and asked Mr. Towner if he
had ever attempted suicide, or had thoughts of committing suicide or hurting himself, and
Mr. Towner answered "No," and "Never." (DefEx.A, at 1:20-2:15.) Mr. Towner then began
gently waiving at the air and pulling at his shirt, and told the officer that he was seeing wires.
(DefEx.A,1:45-55.) The officer asked Mr. Towner how the wires made him feel, Mr. Towner
said, just once, "Gonna send me to hell." (DefEx.A, at 2:00.) Mr. Towner subsequently changed
his mind about wanting to go to the hospital, and told the officer instead he wanted to go back
over to his friend Patrick's home. (Tr., p.26, Ls.7-17; Def.Ex.A, at 6:30.) He asked the officer
instead for a ride to his truck; the officer said "maybe" and asked where the truck was parked;
and Mr. Towner told him, "on Government" and "next to the pawn shop." (Def.Ex.A, at 4:00.)
The officer also asked Mr. Towner where he was staying, and Mr. Towner said he had
been evicted from the place he had been staying, and that he could go to a motel but they were
full. (DefEx.A, 7:00-15.) Moments later, Officer John told Mr. Towner that he was going to
put him in handcuffs; Mr. Towner protested, but complied with the officer's instructions to put
his hands behind his back. (DefEx.A, at 7:15-30.) After securing Mr. Towner in the handcuffs,
Officer Johns announced:
So here's the deal, Greg. I can't have you out here, with you thinking that these
wires are out here, man. And you thinking that they're trying to send you to hell.
There's no wires out here man. And you agreed you should be on your meds. So
I'm taking you to the hospital to go talk to somebody first. I don't want to just
send you over to a friend's house. . . . You need to go talk to somebody ...
(DefEx.A, at 7:30-8:00.)
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After making this announcement, Officer Johns conducted a search of Mr. Towner's
person. (Tr., p.31, Ls.17-19.) Though the video does not fully capture the officer's actions, the
officer later testified,
In his pant pocket in the small coin area I felt a plastic object in there that had -that felt fairly hard, and at that time I believed it was a replacement razor blade
head with the plastic cover still on it. . . . So I slowly removed the item.
(Tr., p.19, Ls.8-12.)
The officer testified that, as he was pulling the item out, he recognized it was a plastic
bag, tightly rolled, with a white crystalline powder, which measured approximately one inch by
two inches.

(Tr., p.32, Ls.14-24.)

The officer visually identified the substance to be

methamphetamine. (Tr., p.19, Ls.18-20.) The officer put Mr. Towner in the back of the patrol
car and drove him to the Kootenai County jail, not to a hospital. (Tr., p.20, Ls.18-25.)

The

State later charged Mr. Towner with possessing a controlled substance and with being a
persistent violator. (R. pp .11, 36.)
Mr. Towner filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was found in his pocket,
claiming the officer's conduct violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures. (R., pp.41, 53-57.) The State filed a memorandum in opposition, asserting that the
officer's conduct fell within the officer's "community caretaking function." (R., p.58.) The State
asserted that the officer's conduct in taking Mr. Towner "into protective custody" was
"reasonable based on Officer Johns' concern for [Mr. Towner's] safety." (R., p.60.) The State
characterized the search as a "pat search," arguing that it was justified for safety reasons, and that
a "pat-search" for illegal drugs and weapons is permissible whenever an officer takes a person
into protective custody. (R., p.60; Tr., p.36, Ls.4-19.)

4

The district court denied Mr. Towner's motion to suppress. (Tr., p.42, L.1-2; see also
R., p.66.) In explaining its ruling from the bench, the district court concluded that the officer's
conduct was a reasonable exercise of his community caretaking function; specifically the district
court reasoned:
I think, based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer
Johns to believe Mr. Towner needed some assistance, needed to get to the
hospital, and so the community care-taking function [applies] in this case.
(Tr., p.46, Ls.10-15.)
The district court found that the officer's action of handcuffing Mr. Towner and taking
him into protective custody "was really quite minimal." (Tr., p.45, Ls.21-22.) In support of its
conclusion that the officer's action was reasonable, the district court made the following factual
findings:
The discussion was very cordial. There is no doubt after viewing the video that
Mr. Towner is hallucinating. He is calm. He is coherent, but [as] Officer Johns
testified, is not speaking or responding in a relevant fashion, and that clearly is the
case, so he's having difficulty, and Mr. Towner even said it would be a good idea
to go to the hospital to get back on is meds, admitted that he hadn't been on his
meds, so I don't believe that I need to get into the analysis of 66-329 and 66-317
[statutes containing the criteria for involuntary mental health commitment] to
decide whether the community caretaking function [applies] in this case.
(Tr., p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.9.)
Regarding the reasonableness of the search of Mr. Towner's pockets, the district court
provided two alternative rationales. First, the court found that the search was justified as the
result of a weapons pat search, and that the officer acted reasonably in removing the item that felt
like a plastic replacement head for a razor3. (Tr., p.47, Ls.10-12.) Second, taking "guidance"

3

The district court also remarked that, "there may be a doctrine of inevitable discovery that
applies here. If Officer Johns takes him to the hospital, I assume that a some point in time
there's going to be an inventory search of his property at the hospital. I don't know that for a
fact .... " (Tr., p.48, Ls.4-7.) Because the State bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance
5

from the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision in State v. Burns, 2016 WL 4938244
(unpublished), the district court reasoned that the search in this case was not limited to a
weapons search for officer safety, and that "even though it wasn't testified to by Officer Johns,
there could be "other reasons" that Mr. Tower is hallucinating, and that the search inside the
pockets was authorized "to get to the bottom of that issue." (Tr., p.47, L.14- p.48, L.2.)
After the district court denied his suppression motion, Mr. Towner proceeded to trial.
(Tr., p.49, L.6 - p.230, L.10.) The district court admitted the evidence found in Mr. Towner's
coin pocket and a jury convicted him of possessing a controlled substance. (Tr., p.171, Ls.2-10,
p.221, Ls.6-14.) The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Mr. Towner
to seven years fixed, with an order for probation. (R., p.187.) Mr. Towner filed a timely appeal
from his judgment. (R., p.202.)

of the evidence, the lawful means by which the items would inevitably have been discovered, see
State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 126, 132 (2017), the district court's fmding means that the State's
burden was not met, and that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply in this case.
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Towner's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Towner's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Towner asserts that the district court erred, as a matter of law, when it ignored the

statutory requirements that must be met before an officer is permitted to take a person into
mental health protective custody; specifically, that an officer must have a reason to believe the
person is either gravely disabled due to mental illness, or poses an imminent danger to himself or
others.

See LC. § 66-326(1).

The State failed to show that the officer's conduct met the

requirements of the statute, and therefore failed to carry its burden to justify the warrantless
seizure of Mr. Towner as a permissible exercise of the officer's community caretaking function.
The evidence subsequently obtained as the result of the officer's unlawful conduct should have
been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Mr. Towner alternatively argues that, even if the warrantless seizure of Mr. Towner was
justified as a proper exercise of the community caretaking function, the officer's search inside of
Mr. Towner's pockets was not. The evidence found as the result of that search should have been
suppressed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When this Court reviews

an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, it accepts the trial court's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 512 (2010). However, this
Court freely reviews the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of those
facts. State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 242 (2016).
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C.

The District Court Erred In Concluding The Officer's Act Of Taking Mr. Towner Into
Protective Custody Was Within The Officer's Authority Under The Community
Caretaker Exception To The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures .... " U.S. Const. amend IV. Evidence obtained in violation of these protections is
subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of both primary evidence
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, and evidence later discovered and found
to be derivative of an illegality, that is, "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).

A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within an exception to
the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). "In the
absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the
warrant requirement." Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 374 (2014). Once a defendant has
established that a warrantless search occurred, the State bears the burden of establishing that a
valid exception applies. State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 839 (2004).
An officer acting pursuant to his or her "community caretaking function," has been
recognized by Idaho's appellate courts as an "exception" to Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844 (2004); State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302
(Ct. App. 2006). The term "community caretaking functions," used to describe the duties of law
enforcement officers was apparently first described by the United States Supreme Court as it
relates to issues of search and seizure in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). The term
describes of one of the many duties that law enforcement officer have in addition to the duty to
investigate and prevent crime.

Generally, these activities involve an officer's duty to help
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citizens in need of assistance. See State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754 (1997). Among an
officer's community caretaking activities are the responsibilities of police to conduct
administrative inventory searches of impounded vehicles, search for missing persons, mediate
disputes, aid the ill or injured, and provide emergency services. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433; Cutler, 143 Idaho at 302.
In

determining

whether

particular community caretaker

a warrantless

function,

the

search or
Fourth

setzure

Amendment's

was justified by
requirement

of

"reasonableness" always must be met. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844 (2004). In making this
determination, Idaho courts analyze "whether the intrusive action of the police was reasonable
in view of all the surrounding circumstances." Page, 140 Idaho at 844. "There must be a
sufficient public interest furthered by the detention to outweigh the degree and nature of the
intrusion upon the privacy of the detained citizen." Id. "There must also be some genuine and
warranted concern by the officer to justify the detention of a citizen and not simply the officer's
curiosity or an unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity." Id. Finally, "Whenever a person
is detained, the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification."
Cutler, at 302.

In the present case, Officer Johns' initial "seizure" of Mr. Towner, by calling out to him
and having him walk back to talk with the officer, was arguably within his communitycaretaking function. The officer testified he had received a report of a person standing by the
roadside who "appeared to be hallucinating," and the officer recognized Mr. Towner from
previous experience, was familiar with Mr. Towner "having mental health issues," and had
knowledge of an earlier report of apparent welfare concern from the group home where
Mr. Towner had previously been living. (Tr., p.17, Ls.1-12.)

However, the officer's genuine concerns for Mr. Towner's well-being did not justify the
officer's subsequent act of taking him into "protective custody." Even assuming the officer
possessed sufficient information to justify the exercise of a welfare check under the community
caretaking function, taking a person into custody for the evaluation, treatment or care of mental
illness is prohibited by Idaho statute, and an officer is authorized to take that action only if
certain statutory requirements are met. See LC. § 66-326(1 ). Therefore, determining whether
that seizure was lawful turns on whether the State met those statutory requirements.
As demonstrated below, the State failed to carry that burden.
1.

A Peace Officer's Limited Authority To Take A Person Into Custody For Care Or
Treatment Of Mental Illness

An officer's authority to take a person "into custody" for "evaluation, care or treatment of
mental illness," is strictly limited by Idaho Code § 66-326(1 ). That statute provides, in relevant
part:
66-326. DETENTION WITHOUT HEARING. (1) No person shall be taken
into custody or detained as an alleged emergency patient for observation,
diagnosis, evaluation, care or treatment of mental illness unless and until the
court has ordered such apprehension and custody under the provisions outlined
in section 66-329, Idaho Code; provided, however, that a person may be taken
into custody by a peace officer and placed in a facility, or the person may be
detained at a hospital at which the person presented or was brought to receive
medical or mental health care, if the peace officer or a physician medical staff
member of such hospital or a physician's assistant or advanced practice
registered nurse practicing in such hospital has reason to believe that the
person is gravely disabled due to mental illness or the person's continued
liberty poses an imminent danger to that person or others, as evidenced by a
threat of substantial physical harm; ...
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the express language of I.C. § 66-326(1) broadly prohibits the detention or
taking into custody of mentally ill persons for care or treatment of their mental illness, absent
a court order. However, a "peace officer" is granted limited authority to take someone into
11

custody, but only

"if the peace officer . . . has reason to believe that" either of two

circumstances exist: "[a] the person is gravely disabled due to mental illness or [b] the
person's continued liberty poses an imminent danger to that person or others, as evidenced
by a threat of substantial physical harm." Id. ( emphasis added.)
The district court made no finding that Officer Johns' conduct complied with
requirements of Section 66-326(1). 4 (See generally Tr., p.42, L. 1 - p.48, L.19.) The district
court made no finding that Officer Johns had a basis to reasonably believe Mr. Towner was
"gravely disabled due to mental illness," or to reasonably believe Mr. Towner posed an
"imminent danger" to himself or others. (See generally Tr., p.42, L.1 - p.48, L.19.) Nor is
there a factual basis in the record that would support such findings.
In this case, Office Johns testified that he was trained so he could take someone into
protective custody, "If somebody is a threat to themselves or the general public or gravely
disabled." (Tr., p.11, Ls.18-22.) He testified that the reason he handcuffed Mr. Towner and
searched his person was because, "I was planning to place him in protective custody and take
him to the hospital." (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-4.) The officer testified it was his intention at the time
"to go to a mental commitment." (Tr., p.22, Ls.17-19.) To that end, the officer also agreed that
the "confines of the statute might delineate whether or not" he would be permitted to bring a
person into protective custody. (Tr., p.23, Ls.20-23.)
Moreover, it is undisputed that Mr. Towner did not want to be taken to the hospital or
be handcuffed.

The officer's testimony and his bodycam video establish that while

Mr. Towner had initially said he wanted to go to a hospital, he had changed his mind and

4

The district court erroneously believed that no analysis was needed of the provisions of the
mental-health commitment statute. (Tr., p.46, Ls.7-9.)
12

said he didn't want to go (Tr., p.26, Ls. 7-17; Def.Ex.A, at 6:30), and that Mr. Towner
objected to being handcuffed and searched (Tr., p.29, Ls.15-22).
Based on arguments and the undisputed evidence, the district court erred, as a matter
of law, when it concluded it did not need to consider the mental health detention statute in
order to decide that the community caretaking function applied in this case. (Tr., p.46, Ls.79.) Contrary to the district court's conclusion, unless the State met its burden of showing
that Officer Johns' actions were authorized by Idaho Code § 66-326(1), the officer's actions
were unlawful, and his seizure of Mr. Towner cannot be justified as a lawful exercise of his
community caretaking function. As explained below, the State failed to meet that burden.
a.

The Record Does Not Contain Sufficient Facts To Support An Officer's
Reasonable Belief That Mr. Towner Was "Gravely Disabled"

The officer did not have a reason to believe Mr. Towner was "gravely disabled" within
the meaning of the law. Under the statute, "gravely disabled" means a person who, as the result
of mental illness is:
(a) In danger of serious physical harm due to the person's inability to provide
for any of his own basic personal needs, such as nourishment, or essential
clothing, medical care, shelter or safety; or
(b) Lacking insight into his need for treatment and is unable or unwilling to
comply with treatment and, based on his psychiatric history, clinical
observation or other clinical evidence, if he does not receive and comply with
treatment, there is a substantial risk he will continue to physically, emotionally
or mentally deteriorate to the point that the person will, in the reasonably near
future, be in danger of serious physical harm due to the person's inability to
provide for any of his own basic personal needs such as nourishment, essential
clothing, medical care, shelter or safety.
I.C. § 66-317(13).
The officer in this case never testified that he believed Mr. Towner was "gravely disabled
due to mental illness," nor is there evidence in the record to support such a belief (See generally
Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.33, L.24; DefEx.A.) On the contrary, the record shows Mr. Towner was able to
13

provide for his own basic needs. The video shows he was appropriately dressed - in fact dressed
similar to the officer - in shirtsleeves and long pants, and he was wearing a hat to cover his head.
(See generally Def.Ex.A.) He did not appear to be malnourished and was sipping on a soda,

evidently able to provide for his own nourishment and hydration. (Def.Ex.A.) He was outdoors
but wearing a protective cap, sheltering himself from sun damage.

(Def.Ex.A.)

He had a

working cell phone that he used and was capable of calling for friends. (Def.Ex.A.) Although
he had apparently left the group home where he previously had been living, the officer had no
reason for the officer to believe that Mr. Towner obliged to stay there. (See generally Tr., p.8,
L.3 - p.33, L.24.) Mr. Towner knew to go check at a motel (Def.Ex.A, at 7:00-15), and the fact
it was full did not mean he was incapable of securing appropriate shelter. Even if he were
sleeping outdoors, it was early August and inclement weather was not a threat to his safety.
(Tr., p.13, Ls.1-24.)

Mr. Towner also had a truck and, contrary to the officer's subsequent

testimony, he told the officer where it was parked5 and could have slept in there. (Def.Ex.A, at
4:00.)

Mr. Towner was also aware of his medical needs; he knew he had not taken his

medications "for a while"; he agreed it might be good to get back on them, but he was under no
order that he do so. (Def.Ex.A, at 1:00-2:20.) He also knew he could go to the hospital to have
more prescribed (Def.Ex.A, at 1:00-2:20), and there is no suggestion in the record he was
incapable of voluntarily taking that action. (See generally Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.33, L.24; Def.Ex.A.)
Thus, taking Mr. Towner into custody cannot be justified under the statute's "gravely
disabled" provision.

5

The video shows clearly that Mr. Towner told the officer the truck was parked on
"Government," and though Mr. Towner did not identify the cross street by name, he told the
officer it was "next to the pawn shop." (Def.Ex.A, at 4:00.) The officer later agreed that
Mr. Towner had, in fact, given a rough address of the truck's location. (Tr., p.27, Ls.305.)
14

b.

The Record Does Not Contain Sufficient Facts To Support A
Reasonable Belief That Mr. Towner Posed An "Imminent Danger" To
Himself Or To Others

The second alternative ground authorizing a peace officer to take a mentally ill person
into protective custody is if the officer "has reason to believe that the person's continued liberty
poses an imminent danger to that person or others, as evidenced by a threat of substantial
physical harm." LC. § 66-326(1 ).
Useful guidance 6 as to meaning of "physical harm" contemplated by the statute can also
be found in the definition section, which applies to the same chapter.

See I.C. § 66-317.

Specifically, the term "likely to injure himself or others" is defined to mean:
(a) A substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by the proposed
patient upon his own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit
suicide or inflict physical harm on himself; or
(b) A substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by the proposed
patient upon another as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or
which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such
harm;

I.C. 66-317(11 ).
In his testimony at the suppression hearing, the officer testified he believed Mr. Towner
"was a threat to himself if he continued to have free reign, and so that's when I placed him into
protective custody." (Tr., p.17, L.23 - p.18, L.1.) As the basis for his belief, Officer Johns
pointed to the allegation that Mr. Towner "was possibly using illegal substances," that he had
"mental health issues," that it was August and "hot out," and that Mr. Towner "wasn't sure
where his vehicle was even kept at, so he had nowhere to go for safety at that time." (Tr., p.17,
Ls.9-17.) The officer also pointed to the "invisible wires that he thought were going to try to kill
6

"It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and
policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and
provisions." State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382 (1999).
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him and cause him harm." (Tr., p.17, Ls.16-22.) The officer also pointed out that Mr. Towner
had initially wanted to go to the hospital to get back on his medications. (Tr., p.17, Ls.18-24.)
Finally, the officer testified he believed Mr. Towner was a "threat to the general public," because
he observed Mr. Towner attempt to step into the street without first looking to see if vehicles
were coming. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-8.)
These supposed "facts," even if they were supported by the record, do not show that
Mr. Towner posed an "imminent danger" to himself or others "as evidenced by a threat of
substantial physical harm."
First, Mr. Towner did not tell the officer he had no place to stay; he simply told the
officer two places where he was not staying. (De£Ex.A, at 7:00-15.) He said he had been
evicted from his prior place, and that there was the motel, but it was full. (De£Ex.A, at 7:00-15.)
Contrary to the officer's testimony (and as conceded by the officer on cross examination), the
bodycam video shows that Mr. Towner told the officer where the truck was parked, and also told
him that he had a friend he wanted to go to. (De£Ex.A, at 4:04-6:00.)
Mr. Towner told the officer he saw and felt electrical "wires" touching him, and
explained they were "Gonna send me to hell," but this apparent hallucination was not causing
Mr. Towner to act violently, or to threaten substantial physical harm to anyone. It was strange,
but not physically dangerous or harmful.

Significantly, in response to the officer's highly

relevant questions about whether Mr. Towner had thoughts of inflicting harm onto himself or
others, Mr. Towner consistently and repeatedly answered he had never attempted suicide in his
past, and that he was not considering harming himself now. (De£Ex.A at 1:20-55; Tr., p.25, L22
- p.26, L.6.)

Mr. Towner also told the officer he had no thoughts of hurting anyone else.

(Tr., p.25, Ls.22 - p.26, L.6.) Notably, Officer Johns never testified to a subjective belief, or

16

knowledge of actual facts, that were inconsistent in anyway with Mr. Towner's answers. (See
generally Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.33, L.24.) The record from the suppression hearing contains no

evidence that Officer Johns was aware of Mr. Towner ever "inflicting physical harm," or
creating a fear of inflicting such harm, to any another person.
Mr. Towner also acknowledged that he had been "off his meds," and in response to the
officer's questioning, agreed with the officer that it would be "good" to go to the hospital and get
back on them. However, agreeing that it would be "good" to have his medication did not mean
that Mr. Towner presented an "imminent danger" or justify the officer in taking him into custody
to have him committed to a mental hospital. And the officer testified he knew that Mr. Towner
had changed his mind about wanting to go to the hospital. (Tr., p.26, Ls.7-17.) The district
court did not fmd, nor is there evidence that would support a fmding, that allowing Mr. Towner
his liberty threatened "substantial physical harm," or posed "an imminent danger" to
Mr. Towner, or to any other person.
Even if the officer's community caretaking duties justified briefly detaining Mr. Towner
to inquire about his mental health and to ascertain whether the circumstances met the statutory
requirements for taking him into protective custody, the facts known and ascertained by Officer
Johns plainly not meet those requirements. Officer Johns' conduct in taking Mr. Towner was
unlawful, and cannot be justified as an exercise of the officer's community caretaking function.
2.

The Officer Violated The Fourth Amendment When He Took Mr. Towner Into
Custody, And The Evidence Should Have Been Suppressed Under the
Exclusionary Rule

The warrantless seizure violated Mr. Towner's Fourth Amendment rights, and the
evidence seized from his pocket, incident to that seizure, should have been suppressed under the
exclusionary rule, as the direct or indirect fruit of the officer's unlawful conduct. No other
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exception was presented by the State or found by the district court to justify the officer's taking
of Mr. Towner into protective custody. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85
(1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992). For this reason, the district court's
order denying suppression, and allowing the evidence to be admitted at the trial, should be
reversed, and Mr. Towner's judgment of conviction should be vacated.
D.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Officer's Search Inside Mr. Towner's
Coin Pocket And Retrieval Of The Item Was With Officer's Community Caretaking
Function
Alternatively, even if the district court had not erred when it concluded that taking

Mr. Towner into protective custody was a permissible exercise of the officer's community
caretaking function, the district court erred when it concluded that the search inside of
Mr. Towner's small coin pocket was justified as within the scope of that function.
The district court provided alternative rationales for finding that the search was within the
community caretaking duties. First, the district court agreed with the State that the search was
justified for officer safety as a weapons search, and that Officer John's testimony that he
believed the item to be "a razor blade" justified removing it from Mr. Towner's pocket.
(Tr., p.47, Ls.14-16.) However, the officer did not testify he thought the item was "a razor
blade"; the officer testified he believed it was "a plastic replacement razor blade head" with the
"plastic cover still on it."7 (Tr., p.19, Ls.8-12, p.31, Ls.22-23.) The officer confirmed the small
item he felt inside the coin pocket was just an inch by two inches. (Tr., p.32, Ls.21-24; see
Ex.2.)

Such an item is simply not a weapon nor a threat to officer safety. Nor was there

7

A trial court's findings that are not supported by the record are clearly erroneous and cannot be
used to support a trial court's decision. See e.g., Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814 (1994).
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testimony from Officer Johns that he believed the item to be dangerous, or believed it could be
used as a weapon. (See generally Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.33, L.24.)
Second, and taking its guidance from the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision in

State v. Burns, 2016 WL 4938244, the district court erroneously reasoned that the search in this
case was not limited to a weapons search for officer safety, but was justified also because there
could be "other reasons" that Mr. Tower is hallucinating, and that the search inside the pockets
was authorized "to get to the bottom of that issue." (Tr., p.47, L.14 - p.48, L.2.) The district
court's reliance on the Burns decision is misplaced, as the circumstances present in Burns are
wholly different in nature from those presented in Mr. Towner's case.

In Burns, the officer

responded to a 911 call to find the defendant in a running car, parked in his driveway. 2016 WL
4938244 at * 1. The defendant was slumped over the steering wheel, sweating profusely, in and
out of consciousness, and confirmed having taken an antipsychotic as well as previously having
attempted suicide.

Id. at *2.

The Court of Appeals concluded that "these circumstances

established the possibility of a medical emergency."

Id.

The officer in Burns testified he

thought the defendant might have overdosed on prescription medication, and the Court of
Appeals agreed that, under those circumstances, the officer's community caretaking function
justified the officer in searching through the defendant's luggage to look for medications that
could be the source of his medical distress. Id. "The public interest in preventing the type of
harm which could result from an overdose of prescription medication justifies a search of Bums'
luggage to ascertain the extent to which Bums needed medical assistance, as his own life could
have been in peril." Id.
Unlike in Burns, however, Mr. Towner was not unconscious or unresponsive, and there
was no medical emergency that required potential life-saving action. (See generally DefEx.A.)
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He was sipping on a soda, talking with the officer, usmg his cell phone. (See generally
Def.Ex.A.)

Additionally, and unlike the officer in Burns, Officer Johns was not searching

through Mr. Towner's pants in an effort to fmd the "source" of Mr. Towner's mental health
concern or ascertain whether Mr. Towner may be in need of assistance; Officer Johns testified he
conducted the search for officer safety reasons, and no other reason was offered. (See generally
Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.33, L.24.)

Accordingly, the reasoning in Burns is inapplicable to the

circumstances in Mr. Towner's case. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.
The district court erred in concluding that the warrantless search inside of Mr. Towner's
pockets was within the scope of the officer's community caretaking role. The search violated
Mr. Towner's Fourth Amendment rights, and the evidence discovered as the result of that
unlawful conduct should have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Towner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 8th day ofJuly, 2020.

/ s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of July, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

21

